USAs tap i operasjon Iraqi Freedom juli 2003 - Historie

USAs tap i operasjon Iraqi Freedom juli 2003 - Historie


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USAs tap i operasjon Iraqi Freedom Juli 2003

Totalt tap47
TjenestemedlemAlderDato
Første Sgt. Christopher D. Coffin511. juli 2003
Kpl. Travis J. Bradach-Nall212. juli 2003
Pfc. Corey L. Small202. juli 2003
Pfc. Edward James Herrgott203. juli 2003
Sergent. David B. Parson306. juli 2003
Spc. Jeffrey M. Wershow226. juli 2003
Personalet Sgt. Barry Sanford, Sr.467. juli 2003
Sergent. Chad L. Keith217. juli 2003
Sergent. 1. klasse Craig A. Boling388. juli 2003
Pvt. Robert L. McKinley238. juli 2003
Sergent. Roger D. Rowe549. juli 2003
Sergent. 1. klasse Dan Henry Gabrielson399. juli 2003
Lance Cpl. Jason Andrew Tetrault209. juli 2003
Sergent. Melissa Valles269. juli 2003
Spc. Christian Schultz2011. juli 2003
Spc. Joshua M. Neusche2012. juli 2003
Sergent. Jaror C. Puello-Coronado3613. juli 2003
Cpt. Paul J. Cassidy3613. juli 2003
Sergent. Michael T. Crockett2714. juli 2003
Lance Cpl. Cory Ryan Geurin1815. juli 2003
Spc. Ramon Reyes Torres2916. juli 2003
Underoffiser 3. klasse David J. Moreno2617. juli 2003
Sergent. Mason Douglas Whetstone3017. juli 2003
Spc. Joel L. Bertoldie2018. juli 2003
Andre løytnant Jonathan D. Rozier2519. juli 2003
Sergent. Jason D. Jordan2420. juli 2003
Master Sgt. David A. Scott5120. juli 2003
Sergent. Justin W. Garvey2320. juli 2003
Sergent. Første klasse Christopher R. Willoughby2920. juli 2003
Kpl. Mark A. Bibby2521. juli 2003
Spc. Jon P. Fettig3022. juli 2003
Spc. Brett T. Christian2723. juli 2003
Joshua T. Byers2923. juli 2003
Kpl. Evan Asa Ashcraft2424. juli 2003
Pfc. Raheen Tyson Heighter2224. juli 2003
Personalet Sgt. Hector R. Perez4024. juli 2003
Sergent. Juan M. Serrano3124. juli 2003
Spc. Jonathan P. Barnes2126. juli 2003
Pfc. Jonathan M. Cheatham1926. juli 2003
Sergent. Daniel K. Methvin2226. juli 2003
Pfc. Wilfredo Perez Jr.2426. juli 2003
Sergent. Heath A. McMillin2927. juli 2003
Spc. William J. Maher III3528. juli 2003
Sergent. Nathaniel Hart Jr.2928. juli 2003
1. løytnant Leif E. Nott2430. juli 2003
Pvt. Michael J. Deutsch2131. juli 2003
Spc. James I. Lambert III2231. juli 2003

Army Spc. Vincent Sebastian Ibarria

22, fra San Antonio, døde 3. juli i en kjøretøyulykke i Farah, Afghanistan. Ibarria ble tildelt 2. bataljon, 22. infanteriregiment, 1. infanteribrigade kamplag, 10. fjelldivisjon, Fort Drum, New York. Ibarrias priser og dekorasjoner inkluderer National Defense Service Medal, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Afghanistan Campaign Medal with Campaign Star, Army Achievement Medal og Army Service Ribbon. Hendelsen er under etterforskning.

Pentagon kunngjorde døden til en soldat drept i en kjøretøyulykke i Afghanistan.

Spc. Vincent Sebastian Ibarria, 21, fra San Antonio døde 3. juli i Farah, Afghanistan, ifølge en pressemelding fra Pentagon. Hendelsen er under etterforskning.

Ibarria ble tildelt 2. bataljon, 22. infanteriregiment, 1. infanteribrigade kamplag, 10. fjelldivisjon, Fort Drum, New York.

"Våre tanker og bønner er hos familien og vennene til Spc. Vincent Ibarria i denne vanskelige tiden. Tapet av en hvilken som helst fjellsoldat har en varig innvirkning på hvert medlem av teamet. Den 10. fjelldivisjon sørger over tapet av Spc. Ibarria, han vil bli sterkt savnet fra formasjonene våre, ”sa oberstløytnant Kamil Sztalkoper, talsmann for 10. fjelldivisjon.

Ibarrias priser og dekorasjoner inkluderer National Defense Service Medal, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Afghanistan Campaign Medal with Campaign Star, Army Achievement Medal og Army Service Ribbon.


USAs tap i operasjon Iraqi Freedom juli 2003 - Historie

SHOP FOR 2ND ARMORED CAVALRY DIVISION APPAREL & amp GAVER:

"Toujours Pr & ecirct"

(Oppdatert 5-30-08)

Enheten som de fleste veteraner fra den kalde krigstiden kjente som det andre pansrede kavaleriregimentet (ACR) har nylig deltatt i Stryker pansrede kjøretøy og er nå utpekt som det andre Stryker kavaleriregimentet (SCR). Det andre Stryker Cavalry Regiment er en militær enhet i den amerikanske hæren som kan spore slekten tilbake til begynnelsen av 1800 -tallet. 2SCR har utmerkelsen av å være den lengste kontinuerlig tjenende enheten i den amerikanske hæren. Oppdraget til 2. Cav er, etter å ha mottatt ordre, å raskt distribuere og utføre rekognoserings- og sikkerhetsoperasjoner hvor som helst i verden og være forberedt på å kjempe ved ankomst og vinne.

Det andre regimentet for dragoner ble konstituert 23. mai 1836 for å kjempe i Seminole Indian Campaigns i Florida. Dragonen var i utgangspunktet en montert infanterist. Denne typen enheter ble ansett for å være den mest kapable i å beseire den smidige og unnvikende Seminole. Fra disse kampanjene tjente regimentet sin første Battle Streamer. De andre dragonene tjenestegjorde deretter ved grensen til Texas og voktet den vestlige utvidelsen av nasjonen. Regimentet kjempet i den meksikansk-amerikanske krigen, de tidlige grensene til indiske kriger, Bleeding Kansas og mormonkrigen i Utah.

Da borgerkrigen begynte våren 1861, tok de andre dragoner den lange turen over USA for å slutte seg til føderale styrker rundt Washington DC. Elementer av enheten ankom i tide for å delta i det første slaget ved Bull Run. De andre dragoner, som alle monterte enheter, ble omorganisert og ble det andre amerikanske kavaleriet 3. august 1861. Det andre amerikanske kavaleriet tjenestegjorde i nesten alle større slag og kampanjer som den føderale hæren i Potomac deltok i. Regimentet tjente. 14 Battle Streamers under borgerkrigen og tre andre Cavalry Troopers ble tildelt Congressional Medal of Honor.

Etter borgerkrigen kom det andre kavaleriet tilbake til Vesten. Gjennom 1890 deltok regimentet i de indiske krigene. Det andre kavaleriregimentet var spredt over grensen, der de ble bedt om å beholde freden, utforske de enorme ukjente landene på nytt territorium, etablere fort og utvikle veisystemer og telegraflinjer. Det andre amerikanske kavaleriregimentet la til elleve ekstra kampstrømmer fra de indiske krigene til fargene. Femten andre troopere fra det andre kavaleriet ble tildelt Congressional Medal of Honor i løpet av denne perioden.

I 1898, under den spansk-amerikanske krigen, distribuerte det andre kavaleriet til Cuba og sluttet seg til Teddy Roosevelt og Rough Riders i kampene ved El Canay, San Juan Hill, Aquadores og Santiago. Det andre kavaleriregimentet bodde på Cuba på okkupasjonstjeneste til 1903. Fra 1903 til 1906 og igjen fra 1910 til 1912 tjenestegjorde regimentet på de filippinske øyene. Der gjennomførte de operasjoner mot Moro -innfødte og opprøret mot den etablerte filippinske regjeringen. Da de kom tilbake fra Filippinene, ble det andre kavaleriet stasjonert i Fort Bliss, Texas for å utføre grensesikkerhet under de turbulente årene av den meksikanske revolusjonen.

Første verdenskrig var en annen æra der det andre kavaleriregimentet markerte seg. I 1917 trente regimentet, basert på Forts Ethan Allan, VT og Fort Myers, VA ytterligere kavalerienheter for den kommende krigen. Basert på sitt rykte og sin historie, ba General Pershing regimentet om å tjene i American Expeditionary Force (AEF), og i 1917 distribuerte regimentet til Europa som den eneste amerikanske hestemonterte kavalerienheten som kjempet i første verdenskrig. Regimentet tjenestegjorde i hele den amerikanske sektoren og utførte kavalerioperasjoner og ble brukt som en utnyttelsesstyrke i flere kampoperasjoner, som jobbet som dragoner, og gikk av for å holde nøkkelterreng. Gjennom disse handlingene beviste regimentet at hestemonterte kavalerienheter fortsatt hadde verdi på den moderne slagmarken. Det andre kavaleriet ble værende hos okkupasjonshæren i Tyskland ved Koblenz til august 1919.

I mellomkrigstiden ble det andre kavaleriregimentet stasjonert i Fort Riley, Kansas. Der utførte regimentet fredstidsoppgaver som kavaleriskolens opplæringsregiment fra 1919 til 1939. På Fort Riley eksperimenterte regimentet med de første pansrede bilene, og i 1936, etter hvert som flere penger ble tilgjengelig for manøvrer, deltok det i de første pansrede og kavaleriske manøvrene. .

Da USA gikk inn i andre verdenskrig 7. desember 1941, var det andre amerikanske kavaleriregimentet dypt involvert i opplæring av kavalerietroppere i mekaniserte operasjoner ved Fort Riley. Justeringer ble gjort innenfor alle de eksisterende kavaleriregimentene for å hjelpe til med å lage nye pansrede enheter som var nødvendige for å kjempe i Europa. Etter omstruktureringen, i januar 1943, ble regimentet utpekt på nytt som den andre kavalerigruppen (mekanisert).

Under andre verdenskrig landet regimentet under den nye betegnelsen "2nd Cavalry Group" i Frankrike 19. juli 1944 og ble en del av general Pattons tredje hær. I løpet av denne perioden ble regimentet kjent som "Ghosts of Patton's Army" på grunn av deres evne til å utføre rekognosering, og materialiserte seg tilsynelatende etter vilje bak tyske linjer. Regimentet gjorde den dypeste inntrengningen av krigen, og ankom Tsjekkoslovakia før de til slutt koblet seg til sovjetiske styrker på vei vestover. Regimentet gjennomførte også et berømt raid bak sovjetiske linjer for å redde de berømte Lipizzaner -hingstene.

På slutten av krigen ble enheter som holdt avstamningen til de andre dragonene omdøpt til det andre amerikanske konstabulære regimentet. Oppdraget deres var først å tjene som okkupasjonsstyrker, deretter som overvåking og sikkerhet langs jernteppet i Øst -Tyskland og Tsjekkoslovakia. Regimentet ble værende i Tyskland de neste 47 årene. Det andre konstabulære regimentet ble omorganisert og omdøpt til det andre pansrede kavaleriregimentet i 1948. Det andre ACR tjenestegjorde langs de østtyske og tsjekkoslovakiske geopolitiske grensene for resten av den kalde krigen, til 1992. I løpet av denne perioden satte dragonene ut et nytt våpen, stridsvogner og utstyr mens du tjener på forkant av frihetens grense.

Da Irak invaderte Kuwait i august 1990, var 2d ACR en fullt utdannet, kombinert våpenbekjempelsesenhet, utstyrt med M1A1 Abrams-tanker og M-2 Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicles. Mens regimentets oppdrag i fredstid hadde vært forsvar og avskrekking langs grensen, skulle oppdraget deres fra krigen være dekkende styrke for U.S. VII Corps. I november 1990 distribuerte den andre ACR til Saudi -Arabia til støtte for Operation Desert Shield (senere Operation Desert Storm) der de skulle stå i spissen for VII Corps 'angrep. 26. februar 1991 var regimentet sterkt involvert i å blokkere den irakiske motangrepet til Kuwait av syv av Saddam Husseins republikanske garde -divisjoner. På et øde sted dypt i den østlige irakiske ørkenen engasjerte det andre pansrede kavaleriregimentet Tawakalna -divisjonen. Dette engasjementet ble kjent som "Battle of 73 Easting." Resultatet av denne kampen var ødeleggelsen av den irakiske pansrede styrken som tjente regimentet Army's Valorous Unit Award. Aksjonene mot de irakiske divisjonene har blitt instruksjonseksempler på moderne pansret krigføring med høy intensitet.

Da han kom tilbake fra Gulfen, ble regimentet flyttet fra Tyskland til Fort Lewis, Washington etter 49 år med kontinuerlig utenlandstjeneste. Regimentets bakkeskvadroner ble omgjort til en lett kavalerienhet bestående av Humvees (Scout HMMWV) montert med TOW-løfteraketter, MK-19 granatkastere, .50 kaliber maskingevær og troppens automatvåpen (SAW). Det andre ACR (Light) ble deretter sendt til Ft Polk, LA i 1992. Det andre pansrede kavaleriregimentet (Light) ble "Corps Cavalry" eller øynene og ørene til XVIII Airborne Corps. På Fort Polk ble den fjerde skvadronen (Regimental Aviation Squadron) lagt til det nye regimentets organisasjon. Tillegget av 4/2 ACR (Air Cav), med deres OH-58D Kiowa Warrior speiderhelikoptre og UH-60 helikoptre, fullførte regimentets omorganisering til et lett kavaleriregiment.

Regimentet ble deretter utplassert til støtte for Operation Uphold Democracy på Haiti fra 1995 til 1996. I 1997 ble andre ACR distribuert til Bosnia for å tjene som en del av NATOs SFOR til støtte for Operation Joint Guard for fredsbevarende operasjoner i landet.

Etter at han kom tilbake fra Bosnia, returnerte regimentet til Fort Polk, Louisiana. I 2002 ble deler av regimentet distribuert til Sørvest -Asia for å støtte Operation Enduring Freedom i Afghanistan som en del av den globale krigen mot terrorisme. Snart distribuerte enheten igjen til Gulfen, denne gangen for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Med bare 96 timers varsel satte regimentet ut den andre skvadronen og O -troppen (luftkavaleriet) for å beskytte V Corps kommunikasjonslinjer under store kampoperasjoner mot den irakiske hæren. I mai 2003 ble hele regimentet utplassert og tjenestegjort i Bagdad -operasjonsområdet. Ved Sadr -opprøret i april 2004 ble regimentets tur forlenget i kamp. Den andre ACR kjempet urbane kamper i Sadr City, Diwaniya, Al Kut, Kufa og An Najaf. Regimentet ble værende i totalt 16 måneder og tjente presidentenhetens sitat.

I mars 2005 ble den andre ACR flyttet til Fort Lewis, Washington. I april 2005 ble regimentet utnevnt til det andre kavaleriregimentet på nytt og begynte å omorganisere seg til hærens nyeste Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). Regimentet var på vei tilbake til sitt opprinnelige oppdrag som dragoner, eller montert infanteri.

Juni 2006 gjennomførte det andre kavaleriregimentet og den første brigaden i den 25. infanteridivisjonen en felles seremoni om flagg og foringsrør. Den andre CR ble flagget på nytt som den fjerde brigaden, 2. infanteridivisjon (Stryker). Den første brigaden, 25. infanteridivisjon avdekket sine brigadefarger og ble flagget på nytt som det andre Stryker Cavalry Regiment (SCR). 15. september 2006 har det andre Stryker Cavalry Regiment vært hjemmebasert på Rose Barracks, Vilseck, Tyskland, i nærheten av Regimentets hjem for den kalde krigen i Nürnberg. Med et grunnlag for infanteribasert taktikk og mobilitet til Stryker-kjøretøyet, har Stryker-brigaden blitt mer en hybridenhet som fyller gapet mellom rent lett infanteri og det mekaniserte, tunge infanteriet.

3. august 2007 ble det holdt en avskjedsseremoni i Vilseck da den andre SCR forberedte seg på å distribuere til Irak til støtte for Operation Iraqi Freedom igjen. De er planlagt for en tur på opptil 15 måneder. Fra sumpene i Florida til Iraks ørkener, har de andre dragonene levd opp til sin motto om "Toujours Pr & ecirct", som betyr "Alltid klar" når nasjonen vår kaller.

2. gavebutikk for Stryker Cavalry Regiment:

Handle andre ACR-gaveelementer og T-skjorter i butikken vår & raquo

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Operasjoner Iraqi Freedom – Resolute Sword – Dragoon Saber

Camp Muleskinner, Irak
Det 2d pansrede kavaleriregimentet og tilknyttede enheter tjente med utmerkelse i den globale krigen mot terrorisme til støtte for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM fra 30. mars 2003 til ny utplassering 15. juli 2004. Regimentet hadde elementer OPCON til 3. infanteridivisjon og 82. luftbårne Divisjon under større kampoperasjoner (30. mars -“15. mai 03) mot Saddams regime og ødeleggelsen av den irakiske hæren og deretter OPCON til 1. pansrede divisjon (16. mai 2003 -15. juli 2004), som utmerker seg ved ekstraordinær heltemodighet og galanteri under kamp, ​​stabilitet og sikkerhetsoperasjoner til støtte for Operation Iraqi Freedom og Operation Resolute Sword (90 dagers kampforlengelse). Uavhengig av oppdraget eller oppgaven, spilte hver skvadron og hvert eget selskap en viktig rolle i å returnere Irak til kontroll over det irakiske folket og til å forbedre livskvaliteten for innbyggerne i Øst -Bagdad og Sør -Irak. Gjennom utplasseringen utførte alle tildelte og tilknyttede enheter sine oppdrag mens de var under konstant trussel fra angrep fra geriljastil fra tidligere regimelojalister, opprørere og utenlandske terrornettverk. Denne fortellingen fremhever noen av Regimentets største prestasjoner, men kan ikke håpe å gi behørig anerkjennelse til alle de bemerkelsesverdige prestasjonene til Troopers of the Regiment. Det er ganske enkelt en oversikt over de store hendelsene som bidro til suksessen til regimentet i løpet av de femten månedene i det irakiske teatret.

Store kampoperasjoner

Det 2d pansrede kavaleriregimentet ble varslet 26. mars 03 og fikk i oppgave å sende en kavaleriskvadron (+) til Irak for å sikre kommunikasjonslinjene for V Corps i den innledende fasen av Operation Iraqi Freedom. 96 timer senere landet regimentet (2/2 ACR og Outlaw Troop (OH-58D) fra 4/2 ACR) i Sørvest-Asia. April 2003 krysset disse elementene i det 2d pansrede kavaleriregimentet grensen mellom Kuwait og Irak for å utføre offensive operasjoner mot Saddams regime og den irakiske hæren. 2d skvadron og den regimentelle TAC ledet av den 71. oberst ved regimentet, COL Terry Wolff, flyttet for å sikre det bakre området til V Corps og forhindre geriljeangrep av Fedayeen Saddam -styrker på kommunikasjonslinjene som korpset, ledet av det tredje infanteriet Division, flyttet nordover for å ødelegge den irakiske hæren og avslutte Ba ’ ath Party Regime under Saddam Hussein. Regimentet jobbet med elementer fra 82d Airborne Division fra 6. april 2003 til 9. april 2003 og opererte i og rundt As Samawah for å finne, fikse og ødelegge Fedayeen Saddam uregelmessige styrker som opererte i området, begrense strømmen av våpen og militante styrker som reiser langs motorvei 9, og gjenåpne en alternativ forsyningslinje fra Kuwait til Bagdad. Ved å bruke en blanding av dødelige og ikke-dødelige branner, sjekkpunktsoperasjoner, tvangsorientert sonespann og overveldende ildkraft i tre dager, rydding og sikring av de tre store byområdene langs ASR MIAMI (HWY 9) mellom As Samawah og An Najaf.

April 2003 flyttet 2d skvadron nordover til An Najaf og etablerte en fremover operasjonsbase i en forlatt Fedayeen treningsleir i den østlige delen av byen. Derfra gjennomførte de kampoperasjoner som strakte seg over nesten hundre mil i alle retninger. Regimentet fant, grep og ødela mange cachede luftvernvåpensystemer og utallige mørtelrunder og angrepsgeværer. I tillegg fant og raidet de Ba ’ ath Party Headquarters -bygningen i Diwaniyah, og ga enorme mengder etterretningsdokumentasjon, inkludert medlemsrullene til hele Ba ’ ath Party i og rundt Diwaniyah. Regimentet gjennomførte også ruteklarering og konvoi -eskorteoppdrag langs de primære og alternative forsyningsrutene i Sør -Irak under denne kritiske fasen av krigen. Regimentets utvetydige suksess i oppdraget, en ti dager lang kampoperasjon som strekker seg 750 km fra Kuwait til Bagdad, skyldtes deres mot, taktiske ekspertise og urokkelige engasjement og sørget for en uavbrutt strøm av kritisk nødvendige forsyninger til hovedkorpset i V Corps innsats i Bagdad, og tillot bevegelsesfrihet for den fjerde infanteridivisjonen, tredje ACR og andre oppfølgingsenheter for å flytte gjennom til Nord- og Vest-Irak og fullføre ødeleggelsen av Saddam Hussein ’ s regime. For deres heroiske innsats ble Regimental TAC, 2. skvadron og tilknyttede dragoner tildelt Presidential Unit Citation som et underordnet element i 3. infanteridivisjon.

Bagdads operasjonsområde

17. april 2003 -“1. april 2004

Regimentets operasjonsområde (AO) fra 03. april-“04. april var østsiden av Bagdad, en befolkning på 3-4 millioner mennesker, hovedsakelig sjiamuslimer med en relativt stor kristen sektor, blandet sunni befolkning og en palestinsk flyktningleir. Denne AO ​​inkluderte hovedsakelig Shi ’ et nabolag på 9 Nissian og Shi ’ et slumkvarter i Sadr City (tidligere Saddam City). Sadr City var regimentets viktigste innsats i denne fasen. I løpet av denne fasen av operasjonen ble 2-37 AR av 1AD knyttet til regimentet og 3. skvadron ble løsrevet til 2. BCT/1AD hvor den utførte konvoisikkerhetsoppdrag for koalisjonen midlertidig myndighet gjennom Irak.

MISJON: 2ACR gjennomfører fullspekteroperasjoner for å gjenopprette orden i Bagdad-operasjonsområdet for å muliggjøre etablering av en selvforsynt, representativ regjering i Irak. Etter ordre, overfør ansvaret til en passende sivil eller militær myndighet, slik at regimentet kan distribuere om.

Daglig drift i Bagdad:

-¢ Rekognoseringspatruljer og offensive operasjoner fokusert på tidligere regimelojalister, utenlandske terrorister og religiøse ledere som aktivt motarbeider koalisjonsinnsats

-¢ Fast nettstedssikkerhet fokusert på kritisk infrastruktur, politistasjoner og sykehus

-¢ Bistå i reparasjon av infrastruktur for å forbedre den irakiske livskvaliteten

-¢ Støtte opprettelsen av irakiske institusjoner for å forsterke et trygt og sikkert miljø

-¢ Støtter opprettelsen av en lokal regjering

-¢ Omtrent 700 soldater som gjennomfører 100 monterte og demonterte patruljer daglig

-¢ 3-5 luftrekonstruksjoner gjennomført i 12-15 timer daglig fokusert langs store ruter, faste steder og offentlige arbeider

-¢ Quick Reaction Force (QRF) i platonstørrelse på hver FOB

-¢ 1 Scout Weapons Team (SWT = 2xOH-58D Scout helos) og 1 UH-60 QRF tilgjengelig 24/7

-¢ Rekrutterte og trente en irakisk lett infanteribrigade

Operation Dragoon Sabre: An Najaf, Kufa, Ad-Diwaniyah, Al-Kut

SITUASJON i april 2004: 2ACR hadde fullført sin 12 måneders tur i Irak og gjennomførte den siste fasen av en kampoverlevering av operasjonsområdet i Bagdad til 1. BCT, 1. kavaleridivisjon satt til 10. april 2004. 2. skvadron hadde re -ansatt i Fort Polk 1. april og regimentets forhåndspartier hadde flyttet ned til Kuwait for å begynne havneaktiviteter. Regimentets hele luftmakt i 4. skvadron hadde fløyet ned til Kuwait for å begynne å laste på skip for omplassering. Resten av regimentet forberedte seg på å marsjere sørover til Kuwait for gjenåpning.

Tidlig 4. april 2004 deltok Muqtada Al-Sadr's Mahdi Militia i en stor demonstrasjon ved Coalition Provisional Authority HQ i An Najaf, sør for Bagdad. To dager senere angrep og beslagla hundrevis av tilhengere av Al-Sadr ’ viktige steder i An Najaf, Ad-Diwaniyah og Al-Kut som i hovedsak ga dem kontroll over Sør-Sentral-Irak. I dagene som fulgte 3. skvadron av 2ACR, deltok OPCON til 2BCT/1AD i et angrep mot militsen i Al-Kut for å beseire militshøyden der. April 2004 Sadr -opprøret var i full kraft, en endring i th
e driftssituasjonen som ikke var forventet. 1. pansrede divisjon og andre ACR ville bli forlenget i 90 dager i kamp for å legge ned dette opprøret og beseire Sadr ’s ulovlige milits.

Operasjon Dragoon Saber begynte den første uken i april og regimentets hovedorgan lettet 2BCT for å ta kontroll over Al-Kut. Regimentet fikk deretter i oppgave å avlaste elementer fra 1ID som hadde blitt plassert nær An Najaf etter at militsoffensiven hadde skjedd i byen. 1. skvadron forble i Al-Kut sammen med regimentstøtteeskvadronen. 4. skvadron flyttet fra Kuwait opp til Al-Kut for å begynne å gjennomføre luftstøtte fra operasjonsbasen fremover. April 2004 påtok seg det 2d pansrede kavaleriregimentet, med tilknyttet Task Force 2d Battalion, 37. rustning, fra 1. pansrede divisjon, oppdrag fra 3d brigade, 1. infanteridivisjon, i den hellige byen An Najaf, Irak. 3. skvadron kom tilbake til regimentskontroll på dette tidspunktet. Fienden, kjent som Muqtada ’s milits, kontrollerte An Najaf og nabo Al Kufa. Oppdragserklæringen: ødelegge militsen og gjenopprette orden til An Najaf og Al Kufa for å tillate overgang av myndighet til en legitim irakisk regjering og, på bestilling, overføre sikkerhetsansvar til irakiske sikkerhetsstyrker. 2d ACR og vedlegg kjempet non-stop i seks uker og brøt fiendens kampvilje. De ødela over 600 militser og skadet utallige andre, fanget og ødela våpen, lyktes med å arrestere to topphjelpere til Muqtada al Sadr og grep våpenbuffer på den hellige kirkegården og Sahla -moskeen, noe som til slutt førte til nederlaget for Sadr ’s milits i Najaf og Kufa.


I dag i historien: 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' begynner

AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite

19. mars 2003: En koalisjon ledet av USA invaderte Irak. President Bush sa at målet med Operation Iraqi Freedom var å "avvæpne Irak, frigjøre befolkningen og forsvare verden mot alvorlig fare." Den irakiske invasjonen ble sterkt støttet av visepresident Cheney. Som forsvarssekretær under Gulfkrigen i 1991 motsatte han seg en invasjon av Irak og sa at det ikke var verdt ofrene eller "å sette seg fast". Omtrent 4.486 amerikanere ble drept i Irak -krigen, og 32.223 andre ble såret. Direkte utgifter til Irak -krigen er anslått til 757 milliarder dollar, et tall som ikke inkluderer renter på penger som er lånt for å finansiere krigen - eller å ta vare på veteraner. En Brown University-studie i 2011 sa at det også kan koste 1 billion dollar mer (gjennom 2050) å ta vare på veteraner fra 105 måneders krigen.

19. mars 2011: President Obama beordret luftangrep mot Libya, som en del av en av FNs sikkerhetsråds beslutning om å håndheve en flyforbudssone. Han sa til kongressen at angrep ble utført med franske, britiske og andre allierte, ville være begrenset i omfang og varighet, og at det å hindre en humanitær katastrofe i Libya var i beste interesse for amerikansk utenrikspolitikk og nasjonale sikkerhetsmål.

Dagens sitat

"Den sanne historien til min administrasjon vil bli skrevet 50 år fra nå, og du og jeg vil ikke være i nærheten for å se den." -George W. Bush


HISTORIE Hvelv: Operation Desert Storm

Selv om den langvarige krigen mellom Iran og Irak hadde endt i en FN-meglet våpenhvile i august 1988, hadde midten av 1990 ennå ikke begynt å forhandle frem en permanent fredsavtale. Da utenriksministrene deres møttes i Genève i juli, så det ut til at freden for fred var lys. To uker senere holdt Saddam Hussein imidlertid en tale der han beskyldte nabolandet Kuwait for å ha suget ut råolje fra deres felles grense, og hevdet at Kuwait og Saudi-Arabia konspirerte for å holde oljeprisene lave i et forsøk på å vandre til vestlige oljekjøpende nasjoner .

I tillegg til Hussein ’s branntale, hadde Irak begynt å samle tropper på grensen til Kuwait. Alarmeret over disse handlingene innledet Egypt Hosni Mubarak i Egypt forhandlinger mellom Irak og Kuwait, men Hussein brøt forhandlingene etter bare to timer, og 2. august 1990 beordret invasjonen av Kuwait. Husseins antagelse om at hans andre arabiske stater ville stå ved ham viste seg å være en feilberegning. Forferdet over disse handlingene fordømte to tredjedeler av de 21 medlemmene i den arabiske ligaen Iraks aggresjonshandling, og Saudi-Arabias kong Fahd, sammen med Kuwait og eksilregjeringen, henvendte seg til USA og andre medlemmer av North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for støtte.


Feil i operasjonen Iraqi Freedom

Det alle kan være enige om med tanke på den nåværende krisen i Irak, er at Operation Iraqi Freedom, slagordet som Pentagon brukte i forkant av invasjonen av Irak i 2003, har vært en stor stor elendig fiasko. Til tross for Pentagon og CIAs planer om å konvertere Irak til et paradis for frihet gjennom massiv død og ødeleggelse fra bomber, missiler, stridsvogner og våpen, er landet i dag et gigantisk helvetehull av vold og fravær av frihet.

Faktisk er Pentagons attentat mot den iranske generalmajor Qassim Suleimani et perfekt tegn på mislykket operasjon Iraqi Freedom. Suleimanis tilstedeværelse i Irak betydde hvor lett iranske tjenestemenn, både militære og ikke-militære, besøker Bagdad og reiser lett rundt i byen, noe som må rasende Pentagon og CIA. Derimot vet amerikanske tjenestemenn at hvis de prøver å gjøre det, vil deres liv raskt bli sluppet ut i landet Operasjon Iraqi Freedom.

Hvordan en amerikaner fortsatt kan være intervensjonist etter denne fiaskoen, er utenfor meg. Operasjon Iraqi Freedom skulle være Pentagons og CIAs kampanje for å vise det amerikanske folket "tjenesten" de kunne tilby, selv om den kalde krigen var over. De kunne invadere land i tredje verden og bringe dem frihet gjennom våpenmakt. Operation Iraqi Freedom skulle være deres utstillingsvindu.

La oss tross alt ikke glemme at invasjonen i Irak var en vanlig gammel angrepskrig, en type krig som ble fordømt som en krigsforbrytelse i Nürnberg. Den amerikanske regjeringen angrep og invaderte et land som aldri hadde angrepet USA eller til og med truet med å gjøre det. Det var Irak, ikke den amerikanske regjeringen, som drev selvforsvar.

Krigsforbrytelsen sammensatte det faktum at Irak var et land i den tredje verden, et land som hadde blitt utarmet av mer enn et tiår med brutale amerikanske og FN -sanksjoner. Krigens utfall var aldri i tvil, gitt at det mektigste regimet i historien angrep og invaderte et av de svakeste regimene i verden.

La oss ikke glemme at regimeendring hadde vært målet om brutale amerikanske og FN-sanksjoner i rundt 11 år før den fryktfylte invasjonen etter Irak etter 9/11. I løpet av de 11 årene med sanksjoner hadde amerikanske tjenestemenn gjort det klart for den irakiske diktatoren Saddam Hussein, som en gang hadde vært en nær venn og alliert av det amerikanske nasjonale sikkerhetsetablissementet, at hvis han skulle forlate landet, ville sanksjonene, som var drepe hundretusener av irakiske barn, ville bli opphevet. Amerikanske tjenestemenn håpet at Saddam ville forlate slik at de kunne etablere sitt frihetsparadis på en billig måte - det vil si uten å måtte forårsake død og ødeleggelse med en invasjon og okkupasjon.

Det er verdt å observere at som en del av Operation Iraqi Freedom var det aldri en øvre grense for antall irakere som kunne bli drept og lemlestet i arbeidet med å gjøre Irak til et paradis for frihet. Et hvilket som helst antall irakere drept og lemlestet vil bli ansett som "verdt det", selv om de døde tydeligvis ikke ville være i nærheten for å nyte all den "friheten".


Glemmer motinsurgering, igjen: Leksjoner fra gjenoppbygging og operasjon av irakisk frihet

Pentagon er engasjert i en strategisk transformasjon som kan sette fremtiden for amerikansk nasjonal sikkerhet i fare. I følge en uavhengig topartskommisjon fra 2018 oppnevnt av kongressen, har USAs opptatthet av motopprør (COIN) og terrorbekjempelse gjort det mulig for nær jevnaldrende og useriøse stater å redusere kapasitetsgapet mellom militærene og verdens eneste supermakt. Politikere og forsvarssamfunnet må erkjenne at stormaktskonkurranse ikke bare er en test av konvensjonell militær styrke, det krever også mestring av handlinger under terskelen for større krig som inkluderer motopprør, uregelmessig krigføring, hybride trusler, stabilitetsoperasjoner og "grå sone." En MYNT -evne er kritisk for amerikansk konkurranse og konflikt med andre stater, og krig med ikke -statlige aktører. Den amerikanske hæren bør være forsiktig så den ikke bruker for mange ressurser til krig med høy intensitet. Denne artikkelen undersøker tjenestens endrede tilnærming til beredskap og trussellandskapet. It then compares the transition from official hostilities to stability operations early in post–Civil War Reconstruction (1865–1866) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003–2004) to demonstrate that counterinsurgency requires a heavy commitment to manpower and training.

The Army has not completely abandoned COIN. It retains the capability through doctrine, education, and assistance it provides to other armed forces. 2018 Army Strategy and 2019 Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations affirm that irregular warfare is important—a view echoed by Pentagon officials and an officer self-study webpage. A 2019 article in War Room, the online journal of the Army War College, actually criticizes the counterinsurgency emphasis of the training.

The general trend, however, has been a course correction. Congress and the defense community doubt American readiness for a major conflict. In January 2017, for example, the Army reported only three of fifty-eight brigade combat teams ready for immediate deployment. The result is a growing emphasis on the dangers that China and Russia pose. 2018 National Defense Strategy declares that “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.” More evidence of this shift can be found in the 2018 National Military Strategy, the 2019 Army Modernization Strategy, and the Pentagon purchase of new vehicles and weapon systems. Articles in Militær gjennomgang, Small Wars Journal, og War on the Rocks note the Army pivot to conventional warfare. The approval of some senior officers and the decreased size of the service facilitate this trend, as does limited funding that adds pressure to prioritize the greatest threats. Given the Army’s renewed emphasis on major war, its response to insurgencies will depend on security force assistance brigades and special operations forces. Its stability operations will involve small deployments, reliance on partners, and prioritizing aid to civilian agencies.

The Army risks forgetting past experience. Comparable doctrines emerged from Vietnam and Iraq, reflecting the Army’s tendency to avoid preparing for occupations, grudgingly adapt to them, and discard the knowledge afterward. Illustrative of growing disinterest in counterinsurgency are generals who regard irregular tasks as a lesser aspect of conventional duties. The Army’s history with irregular operations reveals that COIN requires more resources, but as Capt. Justin Lynch warns, the Pentagon may “acknowledge the importance of counterinsurgency, but not provide enough training or resources to produce an effective force.”

The Department of Defense formally defines COIN as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.” This article uses it more generally to denote Army activities that promote stability and defeat insurgents. They range from kinetic operations, to enforcing law and order, to winning hearts and minds. These capabilities must remain an Army priority. Navigating the transition from conflict to a condition of stable governance is central to modern warfare. Maintaining a counterinsurgency capability is essential for this mission and reflects the fact that the defense community cannot remove this option from the ones available to policymakers. Concentrating exclusively on conventional fighting implies that America can choose its conflicts, an assumption disproven by history. Irregular operations have imposed a heavy toll in casualties, money spent, and reputation lost. Roughly four-fifths of global conflicts since 1815 have been either civil wars or insurgencies there were 181 of the latter from the Second World War to 2015. Between 1798 and 2018, nearly three-quarters of American operations abroad were irregular, while one-fourth were conventional. Being unable to wage such campaigns reduces the service’s deterrent effect and American influence in unstable, strategic regions.

Critics of this view might argue that many of these counterinsurgencies were wars of choice as opposed to wars of necessity. The problem with this thinking is that states choose to wage war in order to advance their interests. A conflict may appear unnecessary in hindsight, but policymakers at the time regarded it as a national imperative. As military historian Sir Michael Howard wrote, the primary motivation for warfare over the past two centuries has been the ability of humans to “discern, or believe that they can discern, dangers before they become immediate.” Focusing solely on unavoidable wars deprives the Army of capabilities, giving the initiative to hostile actors and thus weakening American foreign policy. The service will struggle to shape the threat environment if it is unable to intervene short of large-scale combat operations.

The ability to win a high-intensity conflict does not produce victory in a counterinsurgency, which frequently involves unique challenges. Army preparations must account for the fact that it will operate among civilians, and that rivals will combine regular and irregular warfare. Moreover, they will support insurgencies to avoid confronting America’s conventional overmatch. China, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia have either fostered such conflicts or can do so. Nonstate actors, with improved access to information and technology, form globally connected insurgencies that elude defeat by moving from one country to another. Articles in Utenrikspolitikk, Militær gjennomgang, Small Wars Journal, og War on the Rocks affirm the relevance of COIN insurgencies will be strategically important to great-power competition.

A comparison of Reconstruction and Operation Iraqi Freedom informs Army planning by revealing that ample manpower and consistent conduct are critical to success . The service will not have enough appropriately trained officers and soldiers if it sidelines counterinsurgency in favor of conventional war.

Troop Numbers

The Army during Reconstruction formed “a patchwork of sovereignties” across the South due to limited manpower. There were approximately one million Federals in uniform as of April 1865, the month the Civil War ended, but that number would drop quickly and dramatically. The number of troops overseeing Reconstruction shrank from about 190,000 in September of that year to roughly twenty-five thousand by December 1866. Available data indicates that this was a demanding assignment. In 1867, for example, the service numbered fifty-seven thousand, and over two-fifths of its companies were stationed in the South in the winter of 1867–1868. The Army force level for Reconstruction was too small for two reasons. First, it was attempting to control a population of nine million people in a territory that equaled the combined size of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Second, it ruled by martial law for most of this period, functioning as “a relief agency, a police force, a court, a public works bureau, and a school system.” The service’s constrained military means were a poor fit for its sweeping political powers. Stability crumbled with troop reductions, and resistance developed in areas devoid of Federals. Whereas soldiers once deterred violence by occupying county seats and towns located at major crossroads, shrinking numbers forced them to cede many rural areas to planters, and left civilians vulnerable to criminals. Many Southern whites engaged in terrorism that targeted the economic and political activity of freedpeople and loyal whites. They burned churches attacked, sued, and killed soldiers intimidated and assaulted loyal whites to expel them seized the property of former slaves and unleashed violence on them, resulting in hundreds of murders. By the end of 1866, much of the South collapsed into “near-statelessness.”

A century and a half later, the issue of insufficient troops likewise hindered the Army from quashing the insurgencies in Iraq, a country larger than California with a population of twenty-five million people. Force levels dropped from nearly 153,000 at the close of fiscal year 2003 to around 102,000 in September 2004.The Army numbered just under five hundred thousand in total between 2003 and 2004 hence, Operation Iraqi Freedom imposed a heavy burden by absorbing between 20 and just over 30 percent of the service’s available manpower. Soldier density varied widely, which frustrated efforts to defeat the enemy as well as to secure the borders, perform constabulary duties, seize weapons caches, handle detainees, and train Iraqi soldiers. There were shortfalls of interrogators, military police, Arabic linguists, interpreters, military intelligence assets, construction units, civil affairs personnel, and engineers. The dearth of combatants limited face-to-face interactions with Iraqis and helped drive some units to act on emotion rather than conducting the careful efforts required to build popular support and minimize collateral damage. Perhaps most importantly, there was usually no operational reserve in theater. It was impossible to balance troop distribution between the center of Iraq and its border areas, which enabled the insurgencies to grow. Units occupied areas until enemy activity faded and then moved on, which allowed the latter to retake those locations. Filling gaps, moreover, required pulling forces from elsewhere, so there were too few soldiers in key zones. Small units lost control of some hostile areas, other communities without large bodies of troops witnessed a decline in Iraqi security capability and greater Sunni-Shia tensions, and towns fell to insurgents due to inadequate protection. In at least one instance, it proved necessary to draw on a corps reserve that could not be reformed for lack of manpower.

Ground-Level Practice

The Army’s ground-level conduct was uneven during Reconstruction, an issue for which officers were largely responsible. Some suspended civil courts yet did not establish military ones for several months. They had flexibility in writing their own rules for legal appeals, and in creating provost courts that at times dealt with the cases of freedpeople. There were disagreements within the Army about the meaning of freedom for former slaves while officers favored written labor contracts for them, another idea was for them to buy land over time. Support for the creation of area militias was not universal. Lenient officers allowed local authorities to remain in office, worked so that ex-Confederates could serve in that capacity, promoted elections, established police companies, and distributed instructions to facilitate interaction between ex-slaves and their prior owners. Other examples of this behavior included the offering of transport for ex-Confederate soldiers, loaning of draft horses to impoverished farmers, providing shelter and food to white and black refugees, and establishing an affairs bureau for former slaves. Heavy-handed officers repressed newspapers, forbid the continued service of ex-Confederates in local offices, chose new authorities, suspended biased laws, determined election outcomes, and ordered militias to obey Army commands. They even tested civilian loyalty, arrested the unpatriotic, and forbid the public’s use of the word “Confederate.”

The Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom also had an inconsistent approach to counterinsurgency. Some units focused on destroying the enemy by adopting relaxed rules of engagement and performed nighttime cordon-and-search operations that detained large numbers of suspects. Other outfits, however, emphasized nation building. This conciliatory approach involved improved interaction with locals and concentrated on safety, employment, economic recovery, essential services, and governance. It featured more precise operations, less obtrusive cordon-and-search operations, a greater reliance on civil affairs teams, and the fielding, sustaining, and use of new Iraqi army and police units as well as Iraqi Civil Defense Corps outfits. Further inconsistencies occurred in the use of artillery. Approaches ranged from counterbattery fire to the combination of counterfire, intelligence collection, and encouraging locals to ensure enemy forces did not take up position on their land.

The True Cost of COIN

The examples of Reconstruction and Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrate that counterinsurgency imposes a heavy burden in terms of force levels and preparation. Special operations forces and security force assistance brigades are too few in number to occupy an extensive territory akin to the American South or the smaller yet more populous Iraq. Restricting COIN capability to situations in which the Army supports a host government—rather than leading the effort—ignores fragile states that struggle to ensure effective rule and their citizens’ safety. A large-scale conflict would leave such countries in disarray, necessitating massive counterinsurgency operations.

This raises the question: How should the service commit most of its funding, time, and resources? The answer depends on the assessment of future threats. High-intensity conflict with China or Russia is the most dangerous outcome, since defeat in the worst case might imperil the American homeland. And yet, this observation could be made of any substantial military rival that the United States faces, past or present. In a more probable scenario, those countries would wage wars so costly that America would allow them freedom of action in their areas of influence. The most likely situation, however, is the recurrence of insurgencies, since they have been more common historically than conventional wars. The Army should prepare for future conflict based on this reality rather than falling into the cyclical trap of retreating intellectually from its most recent COIN experience.

America has an expensive track record with counterinsurgency, suggesting a weakness that China and Russia could exploit. The post-9/11 conflicts—in Afghanistan and Iraq—cost the United States about $1.5 trillion as of 2015. This is slightly more than its financial burden in the First World War and the Korean, Vietnam, and Persian Gulf wars combined. It may appear that the country can afford such conflicts for years to come, as defense spending only represented 3.2 percent of the gross domestic product in 2018. And yet, the staggering reality of a $984 billion national deficit and $22 trillion national debt in 2019 will surely temper excessive military expenditures. Likewise, the current coronavirus pandemic presents the risk of a major economic downturn that could curb defense spending. The financial cost of COIN is a reminder that a failure to prepare forces the Army into the expensive and time-consuming process of adapting on the fly. Long conflicts are expensive ones, and shortening future counterinsurgencies will only be possible if the service has a well-honed capability.

Assessing near-peer threats requires thinking outside the conventional warfare box. Why would China and Russia risk conventional conflict with America when they could foment insurgencies or perpetuate existing ones in places of strategic significance? The Soviet Union and the United States did so in Vietnam and Afghanistan, respectively, to weaken one another during the Cold War. Now, the leaders of China and Russia enjoy the advantage of being able to craft a long-term strategy, one that could depend on the attritional effect of counterinsurgency campaigns to reduce the military strength of the United States. Chinese president Xi Jinping can rule indefinitely and Russian president Vladimir Putin is working to do so. Americans elect a new president every four years, however, which can complicate the efforts of US policymakers to craft an enduring strategy.

The Army must balance the national security issue of the moment and the areas that will be most important over the coming years. It should hone its COIN capacity as part of a comprehensive effort to ensure readiness for missions below the major-war threshold. Failing to do so makes counterinsurgency an American vulnerability that near peers will exploit for asymmetric advantage. Restricting Army readiness to conventional war limits the military options available to policymakers, increasing the risk of escalation with a belligerent adversary. The service needs to be prepared for everything from conventional war to COIN, irregular warfare, hybrid threats, stability operations, and the “gray zone.” The ability to engage America’s enemies across the full spectrum of warfare is the only way that the Army can rightfully claim to be the premier land-fighting force in the world. As a superpower, the United States has global commitments. It must be able to deter, and if necessary, defeat a broad array of adversaries with wide-ranging means of aggression. A strong counterinsurgency capability will be essential.

Alexandre F. Caillot is a PhD Candidate at Temple University specializing in American military history. His dissertation examines the Civil War, namely the combat performance of Union soldiers who entered the Army of the Potomac in time to serve during the Overland Campaign. He is a Junior Fellow, Program on National Security, at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

The author would like to thank the following individuals for unofficial conversations that do not represent the official views of the US Army: Dr. Conrad C. Crane Brig. Gen. (ret) Duke DeLuca Col. (ret) Paul C. Jussel, PhD Dr. Christian B. Keller Col. Jon Klug Maj. Mark Morrison Col. Matthew D. Morton Col. Dave Raugh and Col. (ret) Frank Sobchak. The author would also like to thank Dr. Michael Noonan for offering statistical information from a forthcoming publication on the number of US irregular and conventional operations abroad between 1798 and 2018.


2003 invasjon av Irak

The start of hostilities came after the expiration of a 48-hour deadline which was set by U.S. President George W. Bush, demanding that Saddam Hussein and his two sons Uday and Qusay leave Iraq, ending the diplomatic Iraq disarmament crisis.

The US military operations in this war were conducted under the name of Operasjon Iraqi Freedom. The UK military operations in this war were conducted under the name of Operation Telic. The Australian codename was Operation Falconer.

The United States, with support from approximately 45,000 British, 2,000 Australian and 200 Polish combat forces, entered Iraq primarily through their staging area in Kuwait. Coalition forces also supported Iraqi Kurdish militia troops, estimated to number upwards of 50,000. Included in these forces were groups of Australian SAS and Commando Personnel who performed Recon and combat search and rescue mission along side American and British SF units.

Timeline of the invasion

The invasion was swift, with the collapse of the Iraq government and the military of Iraq in about three weeks. The oil infrastructure of Iraq was rapidly secured with limited damage in that time. Securing the oil infrastructure was considered important in order to prevent Saddam Hussein's forces from destroying it (as happened in 1991, creating environmental and economic problems).

Casualties of the invading forces were limited, while Iraqi military and civilian casualties are unknown, probably at least in the thousands. A study from the Project on Defense Alternatives ( http://www.comw.org/pda/ ), a Boston-based think tank, numbered the Iraqi casualities between 11,000 and 15,000 ( http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/0310rm8.pdf ), and the Iraq Body Count project numbered the civilian Iraqis injured in 20,000 (http://www.iraqbodycount.net/editorial_aug0703.htm). However, the Iraq Body Count projects numbers have been the subject of much debate, and may or may not be overly pessimistic.

The U.S Third Division moved westward and then northward through the desert toward Baghdad, while the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and a UK expeditionary force moved northward through marshland. UK forces secured Iraq's second-largest city, Basra, following two weeks of conflict, although their control of the city was limited. Preexisting electrical and water shortages continued through the conflict and looting began as Iraqi forces collapsed. While British forces began working with local Iraqi Police to enforce order, humanitarian aid began to arrive from ships landing in the port city of Umm Qasr and trucks entering the country through Kuwait.

Three weeks into the invasion U.S. forces moved into Baghdad with limited resistance, Iraqi government officials either disappeared or conceded defeat. Looting took place in the days following. It was alleged that many items in the National Museum of Iraq were amongst looted items. The F.B.I was soon called into Iraq to track down the stolen items. It was found that the initial claims of looting of substantial portions of the collection were somewhat exaggerated and for months people have been returning objects to the museum. Yet, as some of the dust has settled, thousands of antiquities are still missing including dozens from the main collection.

There has been speculation that some objects still missing were not taken by looters after the war, but were taken by Saddam Hussein or his entourage before or during the fighting. There have also been reports that early looters had keys to vaults that held rarer pieces, and some have speculated as to the systematic removal of key artifacts.

Many in the arts and antiquities communities warned policymakers in advance of the need to secure Iriaqi museums. Despite the looting being somewhat less bad than initially feared, the cultural loss of items from ancient Sumeria is significant. The idea that US forces did not guard the museum because they were guarding the Ministry of Oil and Ministry of Interior is apparently true. According to U.S. officials the "reality of the situation on the ground" was that hospitals, water plants, and ministries with vital intelligence needed security more than other sites. There were only enough US troops on the ground to guard a certain number of the many sites that ideally needed protection, and so some "hard choices" were made.

In the north Kurdish forces under the command of U.S. Special Forces captured oil-rich Kirkuk on April 10. On April 15, U.S. forces mostly took control of Tikrit.

As areas were secured, coalition troops began searching for the key members of Saddam Hussein's regime. These individuals were identified by a variety of means, most famously through sets of most-wanted Iraqi playing cards.

On May 1, 2003 George W. Bush landed on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, in a Lockheed S-3 Viking, where he gave a speech announcing end of major combat in the Iraq war. Clearly visible in the background was a banner stating "Mission Accomplished". Bush's landing was criticized by opponents as overly theatrical and expensive. The banner, made by White House personnel (according to a CNN story: http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/10/28/mission.accomplished/) and placed there by the U.S. Navy, was criticized as premature - especially later as the guerrilla war dragged on.

It was soon found that "major combat" being over did not mean that peace had returned to Iraq. The U.S.-led occupation of Iraq thereupon commenced, marked by ongoing violent conflict between the Iraqi and the occupying forces. As of January 2, 2004, the total deaths of American soldiers in the Iraq war since March have reached 483. Of these the majority has been killed after the end of major hostilities on May 1. There is concern being voiced from domestic quarters comparing the situation to previous wars such as the Vietnam War.

The ongoing resistance in Iraq is concentrated in, but not limited to, an area known as the Sunni triangle and Baghdad [1]. Critics point out that the regions where violence is most common are also the most populated regions. This resistance may be described as guerilla warfare. The tactics used thus far include mortars, suicide bombers, roadside bombs, small arms fire, and RPGs, as well as purported sabotage against the oil infrastructure. There are also accusations about attacks toward the power and water infrastructure, but these are rather questionable in nature. In the only widely covered example of what some considered an attack on the power system, two US soldiers were killed, indicating that they may instead have been the target. In the purported attack against a water main, some witnesses reported seeing an explosion on the pipe, but US soldiers and repair crews on the scene stated that it did not appear to have been caused by an explosion.

There is evidence that some of the resistance is organized, perhaps by the fedayeen and other Saddam Hussein or Baath loyalists, religious radicals, Iraqis simply angered over the occupation, and foreign fighters. [1]

Events leading to the invasion

In September 2000, in the Rebuilding America's Defenses report [1], the Project for the New American Century planned an attack on Iraq, independently of whether or not Saddam Hussein remained in power. One year later, on the day of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld is reported to have written in his notes, "best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit S.H. [Saddam Hussein] at same time. Not only UBL [Osama bin Laden]". Shortly thereafter, the George W. Bush administration announced a War on Terrorism, accompanied by the doctrine of preemptive military action dubbed the Bush doctrine. In 2002 the Iraq disarmament crisis arose primarily as a diplomatic situation. In October 2002, the United States Congress granted President Bush the authority to wage war against Iraq. The Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq was worded so as to encourage, but not require, UN Security Council approval for military action. In November 2002, United Nations actions regarding Iraq culminated in the unanimous passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and the resumption of weapons inspections. The United States also began preparations for an invasion of Iraq, with a host of diplomatic, public relations and military preparations.

Payoff of Iraqi Military

Shortly after the sudden collapse of the defense of Baghdad, rumors were circulating in Iraq and elsewhere that there had been a deal struck (a "safqua") wherein the US had bribed key members of the Iraqi military elite and/or the Baath party itself to stand down. These rumors were generally ignored or treated dismissively in the US media and among the US public.

In late May, 2003, General Tommy Franks announced his retirement. Shortly thereafter, he confirmed in an interview with Defense Week that the US had paid Iraqi military leaders to defect. The extent of the defections and their effect on the war were not clear as of this writing (May 24, 2003).

Invasion justification and goals

The stated justification for the invasion included Iraqi production and use of weapons of mass destruction, links with terrorist organizations and human rights violations in Iraq under the Saddam Hussein government. To that end, the stated goals of the invasion, according to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, were: to end the Saddam Hussein government and help Iraq transition to representative self-rule to find and eliminate weapons of mass destruction and terrorists to collect intelligence on networks of weapons of mass destruction and terrorists to end sanctions and to deliver humanitarian support and to secure Iraq's oil fields and resources.

No weapons of mass destruction have been reported as found as of September 21, 2003, though Saddam Hussein's government collapsed, former Palestine Liberation Front leader Abu Abbas was captured, and the oil fields and resources were rapidly secured but have since suffered continued sabotage.

After the fall of Baghdad, U.S. officials claimed that Iraqi officials were being harbored in Syria, and several high-ranking Iraqis have since been detained after being expelled from Syria.

Failed peace initiatives

After the war, evidence began to emerge as to the failed attempts to bring the conflict to a peaceful resolution.

In December 2002, a representative of the head of Iraqi Intelligence, Gen. Tahir Jalil Habbush al Takriti, contacted former CIA counterterrorism head Vincent Cannistraro, stating that Saddam "knew there was a campaign to September 11 and prove he had weapons of mass destruction. The Iraqis were prepared to satisfy these concerns. I reported the conversation to senior levels of the state department and I was told to stand aside and they would handle it." Cannistrano stated that the offers made were all "killed" by the Bush administration, citing that the fact that they all had Saddam Hussein remain in power was unacceptable.

Shortly after, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak's national security advisor, Osama al Baz, sent a message to the U.S. State Department that the Iraqis wanted to discuss the accusations that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction and ties with al-Qaeda. Iraq also attempted to reach the US through the Syrian, French, German, and Russian intelligence services. Nothing came of the attempts.

In January 2003, Lebanese-American Imad al-Hage met with Michael Maloof of the DoD's Office of Special Plans. Hage, a resident of Beiruit, had been recruited by the department to assist in the War on Terrorism. He reported that Mohammed Nassif, a close aide to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, had expressed frustrations about the difficulties of Syria contacting the United States, and had attempted to use him as an intermediary. Maloof arranged for Hage to meet with Richard Perle, head of the Defense Policy Board.

In February 2003, Hage met with the chief of Iraqi intelligence's foreign operations, Hassan al-Obeidi. Obeidi told Hage that Baghdad didn't understand why they were being targetted, and that they had no WMDs he then made the offer for Washington to send in 2000 FBI agents to ascertain this. He additionally offered oil concessions, but stopped short of having Hussein give up power, instead suggesting that elections could be held in two years. Later, Obeidi suggested that Hage travel to Baghdad for talks he accepted.

Later that month, Hage met with Gen. Habbush in addition to Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz. He was offered top priority to US firms in oil and mining rights, UN-supervised elections, US inspections (with up to 5,000 inspectors), to have al-Qaeda agent Abdul Rahman Yassin (in Iraqi custody since 1994) handed over as a sign of good faith, and to give "full support for any US plan" in the Arab-Israeli peace process. They also wished to meet with high-ranking US officials. On Feb. 19th, Hage faxed Maloof his report of the trip. Maloof reports having brought the proposal to Jamie Duman. The Pentagon denies that either Wolfowitz or Rumsfeld, Duman's bosses, were aware of the plan.

On February 21st, Maloof informed Duman in an email that Perle wished to meet with Hage and the Iraqis if the Pentagon would clear it. Duman responded "Mike, working this. Keep this close hold.". On March 7th, Perle met with Hage in Knightsbridge, and stated that he wanted to pursue the matter further with people in Washington (both have acknowleged the meeting). A few days later, he informed Hage that Washington refused to let him meet with Habbush to discuss the offer (Hage stated that Perle's response was "that the concensus in Washington was it was a no-go"). Perle told the Times, "The message was 'Tell them that we will see them in Baghdad."

Throughout March, Hage continued to pass messages from Iraqi officials to Maloof. At one point, Maloof wrote a memo stating "Hage quoted Obeidi as saying this is the last window or channel through which this message has gone to the United States. He characterized the tone of Dr. Obeidi as begging." Maloof contacted Perle, stating that Iraqi officials are "prepared to meet with you in Beiruit, and as soon as possible, concerning 'unconditional terms' ", and that "Such a meeting has Saddam Hussein's clearance." No action is taken.

According to an arab source of the Guardian's, Perle sent a Saudi official the following terms for Iraq to fulfill to prevent war: "Saddam's abdication and departure, first to a US military base for interrogation and then into supervised exile, a surrender of Iraqi troops, and the admission that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. "

Attempts were continued even after the war began, up to the fall of Baghdad.

Hage has since become embroiled in a situation involving an earlier incident involving airport security that many have viewed as payback similar to the case of Valerie Plame

Support and opposition

The Bush administration claimed that the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq included 49 nations, a group that was frequently referred to as the "coalition of the willing". These nations provided combat troops, support troops, and logistical support for the invasion. The nations contributing combat forces were, roughly: United States (250,000), United Kingdom (45,000), Australia (2,000), Denmark (200), and Poland (54). Ten other countries were known to have offered small numbers of noncombat forces, mostly either medical teams and specialists in decontamination. In several of these countries a majority of the public was opposed to the war. In Spain polls reported at one time a 90% opposition to the war.

There are some that claim the US intervention took place without any international legal framework. Others would counter by pointing out that the UN Security Council Resolutions authorizing the 1991 invasion gave legal authority to use ". all necessary means. ", which is diplomatic code for going to war. This war ended with a cease fire instead of a permanent peace treaty. Their view was that Iraq had violated the terms of the cease-fire by breaching two key conditions and thus made the invasion of Iraq a legal continuation of the earlier war. To support this stance, one has to "reactivate" the war resolution from 1991 if a war resolution can be reactivated ten years after the fact, it would imply that almost any nation that has ever been at war that ended in a ceasefire (such as Korea) could have the war restarted if any other nation felt at any time that they were no longer meeting the conditions of the cease fire that ended that war. Since the majority of the United Nations security council members (both permanent and rotating) did not support the attack, it appears that they viewed the attack as not being valid under the 1991 resolution.

However, a resolution drafted and accepted the year before the invasion fully endorsed the use of military action to force Iraq to comply with the United Nations desires, and every country that sat upon the Security Council voted to draft that resolution.

Several nations say the attack violated international law as a war of aggression since it lacked the validity of a U.N. Security Council resolution to authorize military force. The Egyptian former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called the intervention a violation of the UN charter.

The United States and United Kingdom claim it was a legal action which they were within their rights to undertake. Along with Poland and Australia, the invasion was supported by the governments of several European nations, including the Czech Republic, Denmark, Portugal, Italy, Hungary, and Spain.

Many people regarded the attack on Iraq to be hypocritical, when other nations such as Israel are also in breach of UN resolutions and have nuclear weapons this argument is controversial [1], as Iraq's history of actually using chemical weapons (against Iran and the Kurdish population in Iraq) suggested at the time that Iraq was a far greater threat.

Although Iraq was known to have pursued an active nuclear weapons development program previously, as well tried to procure materials and equipment for their manufacture, these weapons and material have yet to be discovered. This casts doubt on some of the accusations against Iraq, despite previous UN assertions that Iraq likely harbored such weapons, and that Iraq failed to document and give UN inspectors access to areas suspected of illegal weapons production. However, some believe that the weapons were moved into Syria and Lebanon.

Hussein Family Whereabouts

Saddam Hussein was captured on December 13th, 2003 by the U.S Army's 4th Infantry Division during Operation Red Dawn. His sons Uday and Qusay were killed earlier in 2003 during a raid by the U.S 101st Airborne Division.

Related slogans and terms

This campaign has featured a variety of new and weighted terminology, much coined by the U.S. government and then repeated by the media. The name "Operation Iraqi Freedom", for example, expresses one viewpoint of the purpose of the invasion. Also notable was the exclusive usage of "regime" to refer to the Saddam Hussein government (see also regime change), and "death squads" to refer to fedayeen paramilitary forces. Members of the Hussein government were called by disparaging nicknames - e.g., "Chemical Ali" (Ali Hassan al-Majid), "Comical Ali" (Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf), "Mrs Anthrax" (Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash) - for propaganda purposes and because Western peoples are unfamiliar with Arabic names.

    - The strategy of focusing on reducing the enemy's will to fight through a display of overwhelming force.
  • "embedding" - process of assigning reporters to particular military units
  • "coalition of the willing"
  • untidiness - Rumsfeld's term for the looting and unrest which followed the government's collapse

Media coverage

Media coverage of this war was different in certain ways from that of the Gulf War. The Pentagon established the policy of "embedding" reporters with military units. Viewers in the United States were able to watch U.S. tanks rolling into Baghdad live on television, with a split screen image of the Iraqi Minister of Information claiming that U.S. forces were not in the city. Many foreign observers of the media and especially the television coverage in the USA felt that it was excessively partisan and in some cases "gung-ho"

Another difference was the wide and independent coverage in the World Wide Web demonstrating that for web-surfers in rich countries and the elites in poorer countries, the internet has become mature as a medium, giving about half a billion people access to different versions of events.

However, the coverage itself was intrinsically biased by the fact that internet penetration in Iraq was already very weak (estimate of 12,000 users in Iraq in 2002 [1]), and the deliberate destruction of Iraqi telecommunication facilities by US forces made internet communication even more difficult. Different versions of truth by people who have equal ignorance of first-hand, raw data are by definition a very biased substitute for original, first-hand reports from people living locally.

Al-Jazeera, the Qatar-based news network, which was formed in 1996, gained a lot of worldwide attention for its coverage of the war. Their broadcasts were popular in much of the Arab world, but also to some degree in western nations, with major American networks such as CNN and MSNBC re-broadcasting some of their coverage. Al-Jazeera was well-known for their graphic footage of civilian casualties, which American news media branded as overly sensationalistic. The English website of Al-Jazeera was brought down during the middle of the Iraq war by hackers who saw its coverage as casting a negative view on the American cause.


Blisters on the battlefield: the prevalence of and factors associated with foot friction blisters during Operation Iraqi Freedom I

Bakgrunn: Foot friction blisters in military personnel lessen a soldier's mobility, concentration, and critical decision-making skills.

Objektiv: To determine the prevalence of and factors associated with friction blisters during deployment in all military personnel who nonurgently presented to the 28th Combat Support Hospital.

Methods: A cross-sectional survey was performed at the 28th Combat Support Hospital. Statistical tests used included descriptive statistics, chi-square tests, and logistic regression for nominal data.

Resultater: The response rate was 97% with 872 surveys completed. Blister prevalence was 33% (95% confidence interval [CI] = 30.0-36.4). Eleven percent of these sought treatment (p < 0.001). Factors increasing the risk of developing blisters include female sex (prevalence ratio [PR] = 1.55, 95% CI = 1.27-1.91), wearing boots not broken in (PR = 1.52, CI = 1.26-1.85), longer than 6 months in theater (PR = 1.33, CI = 1.09-1.63), and history of prior blisters (PR = 2.08, CI = 1.69-2.56).

Conclusions: The prevalence of foot friction blisters was 33% during a 12-month block of Operation Iraqi Freedom I. Of these, 11% required medical care. The group most likely to develop blisters is women, ages 26 to 34, who are unable to break in their boots and have a past history of blisters.


Se videoen: 2003 Invasion of Iraq 12. Animated History


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